BAAG Agents and Operatives

Secret agents were employed in large areas of South China from the borders of Siam (Thailand) and Burma as far north as Shanghai, in French Indo China, Siam and Malaya.  Intelligence reports were essentially a by-product of the Escape and Evasion operation, but eventually became ‘an indispensable intelligence link … of the highest importance to our intelligence work in the China Theatre … keeping us informed on all manner of subjects about which we should otherwise know little.’ * 

Communication with agents in occupied territory was maintained by trusted runners.  Each group inside had its own runners and these had no contact with those of other groups.  They used the ordinary smuggling routes and in this way brought out not only reports but enemy documents, publications, periodicals etc.  Special personnel were used for bringing out evaders. 

* War Office memorandum, NA WO 208/517

BAAG Series, Volume VIII “HQ Kweilin”, pg 14

Drawings of debriefing of agents returning from a missions in early 1944:

Debriefing of an Agent

l. to r.: Major Derek Hall-Caine, Ng Ka Sheung, Capt. Y.H. Chan, confidential clerk.

Artist: Lai Ping Hung

Numbers and Groups of Field Intelligence (FIG) Agents, July 1942

AWM 2/5/21-23

BAAG Internal Communications Network

A diagram in Lindsay Ride’s handwriting of the internal BAAG communications network, dated June 7th 1942 to Military Attache, Chungking.

Agent numbers referred to:  

34 -YIP FOO 葉富

50 – BILL CHONG

100 – S B TAN

Lindsay Ride (website: 2.k. Final Report to Whitehall, pg 34): “Incredible as it may seem, for a long time the Chinese Central Government officials in Chungking would not grant us permission to use either W/T or ciphers.   For many months all our A.H.Q. – H.Q.  and H.Q. – Chungking signals had to go in clear over the Chinese telegraph.   Between A.H.Q. and H.Q. we had to resort to a personal code which was naturally most limited and most insecure.”

Implemented Codes

AWM 2/3/46-51

“All communications with our agents in enemy-occupied territory were maintained by means of runners controlled from our forward posts.   Each group of operatives inside had its own runners, and these had no contacts with those of other groups.   They used the ordinary smuggling routes (and facilities), and in this way brought out not only reports but enemy documents, publications, periodicals etc.   Special personnel were used for bringing out evaders.“

“Communications for safehand bags and articles from occupied areas between forward posts and H.Q. was also maintained by runners.   The journey took from 10-14 days using Chinese river and road transport.”

Agent List

Operatives referred to by number

BAAG S- Section

The following information is chiefly extracted from website: 2.p. BAAG Series, Volume VIII Headquarters Kweilin, pg 57.

i)  Security Section.

Condensed from notes by Lindsay Ride: 

The Security Section arose out of a small Security office which we found necessary to set up in late 1942 for our own protection against imposters, enemy agents, and suspects who had threatened to take reprisals against certain officers.

Security as we know it did not exist in South China;   it is true they had a multiplicity of secret organizations ranging from the Central Government ‘Gestapo’ to local security bodies (in Kweilin alone there were at least six of these bodies, all independent and all jealous of one another) but each was primarily interested in political offenders against it’s own particular political group.   Security against Japanese agents was only a minor consideration.

The activities of our security office were at first almost entirely concerned with refugees from Hongkong, those who claimed to be former members of HM Forces or the Hongkong Government, who had to be checked before payments were made.  All applicants for jobs with us also had to pass through the hands of our Security Officer. 

 As the result of interrogation of refugees by “S” section, the BAAG amassed a large amount of information concerning the activities of many people working for the enemy in Hong Kong.  Many of these sooner or later came out to Free China and in only a small number of cases could we induce the Chinese to take an interest in these suspects;   as all Chinese – whatever their nationality by birth – were considered Chinese citizens by China, (so the delicate situation arose of us suspecting and watching Chinese nationals in China).   Agents were employed to follow those who came out into China, until BAAG were satisfied that they were not working for the enemy. 

Amongst those who came out from Hong Kong were a number of third nationals and also Chinese who wished eventually to go to India.   Added to these were two or three hundreds of Indians that had come out through our network.   It can be readily understood therefore how the BAAG, which was the organization through which all the people passed and the only one with any records of them or any knowledge of their activities after the capitulation of Hong Kong, gradually assumed the role of a field interrogation centre for M.I.9 and Security Control in India. *

This section grew rapidly, and it alone employed over 100 secret agents.   A very valuable piece of work undertaken by this section was to investigate the methods used by plain-clothes columns.  Agents were sent up into the area west of Henyang to visit the villages which had actually been occupied by the enemy. **

Copies of all our Security Reports were forwarded to India and very close contact was maintained on all matters relating to Indian security arising out of entry of persons from enemy-occupied areas in South China.

 “S” Section intelligence was not incorporated in KWIZ but in two weekly publications, the BAAG Counter-Espionage Precis and the Survey of Japanese Intelligence Organisations. ***  In addition to this, a card index was made covering over 5,000 suspects and people known to be working for the enemy in Hong Kong.

(ii)  Counter-Espionage Section.

In 1943 an officer was sent from India to investigate the possibility and desirability of setting up a counter-espionage organization in Kweilin.  As it was highly undesirable for another secret British group to attempt to operate in South China,  it was eventually  decided that this work could best be done through the B.A.A.G. “S” Section.  Hence this branch of our work developed an offensive side in addition to its local defensive activities - the Counter Espionage Section.

There was no central pool of Counter Espionage Intelligence in Kweilin.  Apart from the American Intelligence organisations,  the Chinese alone had five organisations, military and political, interested in and occupied with counter intelligence  - namely, (1) the Department for the Direction of Civilian Intelligence (2) the Bureau of Compiling Statistics of Investigations for the Central Government (3) the 5thRegiment of Gendarmes (4) the Aeronautical Commission (5) the Kwangsi Pacification Commissioner’s Office. 

All S-Section agents were all given a number preceded by the letter. 

* Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Cerntre (CSDIC)

** See Appendix "Japanese Intelligence Organisation - Ronin".[11/44/44-47, 52-57, 59, 64, 69, 76.]

*** See sample, Appendix  (11/31/02)

S Section Agents List